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Letters to the editor

C 45.03.2

P. Benson, Breen

Missile test data

While I was pleased to see coverage of the American Security Council's panel on SALT verification, Vernon Guidry's article (Jan. 5) missed the essence of the controversy over Soviet concealment of missile test

data.
The Soviet practice of transmitting such data by means of a secretcode from an inflight missile to a ground station makes it virtually impossible for U.S. intelligence services to learn whether the missilebeing tested is MIRVed. Being ableto determine if a missile is MIRVed will be critical to verifying SALT IL

At Geneva, the Soviets proposed to stop coding such missile test data if the data are important to SALT. But the Soviets would decide what data are important to SALT, and all "unimportant" data they could con-

tinue to encode.
In other words, we would trust the Russians not to conceal data that proved they were violating SALT.

Of course, such a proposal did lit-

tle to satisfy SALT critics...

Brien Benson,

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